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COMPARATIVE CONFLICTS LAW*
ERNST RABEL t
It is a custom in writing about "conflict of laws," to
start with censuring the ineptitude of this title and the
mendacity of that other name, "private international law."
The American Restatement, evidently moved by similar
scruples, chose the title of "The Law of the Conflict of Laws."
I have admired the amplitude of this expression but have
found out that for my purpose more wokds are needed, name-
ly: The Conflict of the Laws of the Conflict of Laws. This
still does not bring out that there is more conflict than law
in the subject-matter.
Complaints against the present conditions of conflicts
law the world over are very serious, indeed. Disgusted ob-
servers-significantly not hard-boiled specialists in the field
-have spoken of a labyrinth and a bankrupt branch of
science. Not one satisfactory codification of it exists. The
Conflicts Restatement with untold labor behind it is recog-
nized as the weakest part in the brilliant series of the Ameri-
can Law Institute. The C6digo Bustamante, adopted in fif-
teen countries, it not often applied. The hope for other treat-
ies has been more often disappointed than fulfilled.
Since the international community of Story and Savigny,
Foelix and Fiore broke down, this department of the law has
been treated as just a sideline of the nationalized private
laws. Its international purpose has been forgotten. In the
narrow confines of state law and ubiquitous public policy,
no frenzied search could discover the magical fluid to re-
vitalize the venerable formulas inherited from the statutists
and so piously preserved, particularly by the French and
American courts. International life has encountered an
awkward, opinionated attitude, and in some instances an
attitude of virtuous selfishness, not seldom an arrogant dis-
regard to contracts and foreign laws. Uncertainty of the
law has driven international commerce into an autonomous
net of standard forms and lawless arbitration, far afield
* This paper was delivered at a Round Table Meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools, December 29, 1948.
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from any national law and court. The hardships of the
present upheaval of the world are aggravated by the ab-
sence of legal order. Let us get back to the purposes of legal
rules determining the applicable law not for the temporary
convenience of the court or the citizens of the forum-or
its treasury-but for the sake of their participation in recip-
rocal nation-wide and world-wide relations.
What is the specific state of things in the 'United States?
We have an enormous wealth of judicial authority, abundant
in factual situations and legal problems, referring to inter-
state relations but using the technique of any conflict of
laws. Thereby these decisions are the richest source of in-
formation in the world for comparative research. And be-
cause they deal with sister states, they are also a model of
consideration for foreign law, a system of mutual tolerance
unattained in any other country. That extraordinarily learned
scholar and fascinating teacher, Joseph Beale, sifted these
overwhelming materials for the first time. Again, his Re-
statement has provoked a wholesome, thoughtful reaction by
numerous eminent writers. To the two comprehensive text-
books, by Goodrich and Stumberg, we are deeply indebted.
There exists, in addition, the imposing literature on the con-
stitutional side of the problem.
The expositions of conflict of laws in the encyclopedias
are not among the assets. They have been incapable of pene-
trating through the curtain of rituajistic formulas behind
which the courts have learned for a century to hide their
true thoughts, and in some instances their thoughtlessness.
These industrious and unhappy surveys make us conscious
of the wilderness from which we must escape.
Comparative research-in this country spearheaded by
Ernest Lorenzen-has to prove once more its clarifying and
inspiring force. This is only natural in a field essentially
requiring an international level of observation. While the
law of nations has never had its internationalism challenged
-- only its existence-the people who travel and migrate, the
families dispersed and displaced, and businessmen working
in foreign jurisdictions or dealing with foreign parties, the
members of nation-wide or international organizations-in-
dividuals and corporations and partnerships with all their
activities crossing state borders, have been abandoned to
the chaotic interplay of national laws. They have become
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victims of the national seclusion of the legal systems, the
positivism of legal science, the legal aspects of economic bar-
riers, and the infinite variety of legal refinements. With at
least sixty countries in the field, plus, for minor divergencies,
some fifty jurisdictions of the United States and ten Canad-
ian provinces, we enjoy one hundred and twenty-odd "laws
of the conflict of laws." The watchword has been: This is
a part of the law of the state-right; therefore it is entirely
impregnated by the legal system of the forum-wrong.
Hence we find: characterization according to the law of the
forum, no renvoi, no party agreement on the applicable
law-almost any policy of the forum being a possible obstacle
to applying a different foreign law.. In France and Italy
they have draped all this outrage with the flag of sovereignty,
and not a few have, in the meantime, substituted the naked
national interest, as a court understands it. In the United
States, Cardozo spoke his famous words: "We are not so pro-
vincial. . . ," and he has been admirably followed. Never-
theless, Beale appropriated Dicey's thesis that a status un-
known to the forum is not recognized. He and other emi-
nent authors have rejected for speculative reasons renvoi
and party autonomy. Most statutes and constitutions declare
that a foreign corporation cannot have more powers than a
domestic one of analogous nature. Thus, a foreign adoption,
legitimation, deed, a foreign joint stock corporation cannot
operate because of some alien features. American courts
have prevailingly used wise restraint, but Latin-American
governments have requested singular things when asked to
license the business of an American corporation.
This reminds me of a true story of my own family. A
three-year old girl had a toy, a white cat mounted on wheels,
which she pulled by a string. One day on the street a cat
came along and her nurse exclaimed, "Look, that sweet little
cat!" But the little girl protested, "Oh no, that is no cat,
it has no wheels." So we do not recognize a Massachusetts
cat, unless we fix it up with wheels. We have here the
entire philosophy of characterization according to the law of
the forum.
If comparative research teaches us anything, it is to
look to the essentials. It ascertains throughout the world
the facts common to all, the common life problems, the com-
mon functions of the legal institutions. This is the neces-
1949]
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sary basis for rules intended to distribute the phenomena of
life to the various jurisdictions.
We need then the right criterion for adequate territorial
connections. In this respect we may discover that provincial-
ism is not the only defect of our doctrine. Another defect
is the lack of a sense for reality, most conspicuous in the
Continental literature until the First World War. And how
else can we explain that in the United States lex loci con-
tractus survives from the naive scholars, 400 to 600 years
back, who believed that a contract made in the territory of
a feudal lord or a free city was born into the sovereign power
of the local seigneur, acquiring a status like a child? How
else to understand the mysterious imperative power, until
recently, of the law of the place of contracting in the consti-
tutional practice, in the conflicts decisions of the state courts,
and in the Restatement of Conflicts? Surviving in a century
when contracts are made by mail and wire and telephone,
and nobody even can ascertain objectively the place of con-
tracting! An action for unjust enrichment is said to be gov-
erned by the law of the place where the enriching act is
done, but if a New York firm is paid too much at a bank
in Paris, it is enriched in New York, not in Paris, because
it may dispose of its account; and what clue should either
contact give us? Law of the place of performance-but a
modern international contract may have ten different places
where the parties have to discharge duties. All these factors,
taken for themselves, are inconclusive.
What is conclusive, generally is decisive everywhere. A
Quebec attorney was once appointed (1864) by the British
Government for services before the Fishery Commission be-
tween Canada and the United States. The appointment was
made in Ottawa, Ontario-place of contracting. The meet-
ings were held in Halifax, Nova Scotia-place of perform-
ance. But the Canadian courts and the Privy Council very
reasonably allowed an action quantum meruit for the attor-
ney's fees according to the law of Quebec.' This is right
because an attorney is rooted at his domicil by his function
in the administration of justice, the organization of his
profession and the living conditions influential on his fees.
We have touched a third trouble, the painful uncertainty
of conflicts law. The courts have usurped the faculty, not
1. Regina v. Doutre, 9 App. Cas. 745 (1884).
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to choose the applicable law under a conflicts rule, but to
choose the conflicts rule in every individual case. This, is
done openly; thus the American courts are said to have the
option among four or five rules at pleasure for localizing a
contract. Choice is made in a disguised manner: The place
of contracting, in selecting the law applicable to the capacity
of a married woman or to an insurance contract, will be
localized in that state whose law appears to furnish the solu-
tion agreeable to the court.
But in 1943 something sensational happened. The Su-
preme Court of the United States formally buried that for-
midable rule, the lex loci contractus, where it had its capi-
tal, in the division of power over the law of contracts be-
tween the states.2 Mr. Justice Black said that "in determin-
ing the power of a state to apply its own regulating laws to
insurance business activities, the question in earlier cases be-
came involved by conceptualistic discussion of theories of the
place of contracting or of performance." So then, the old
rules are dead-if only they knew it themselves!
For American legal science the important point is, as
Professor Harper has stated,3 that the fetters of the tradi-
tional rules have fallen and the way is free. The question
is: What now? A group of American authors enjoys the
iiacuum and greets the liberty of the courts to place a case
under the law allowing the issue to be decided in accordance
with the judge's ideal of justice.
I hope that these scholars nevertheless will be satisfied
with firm rules gained from continued studies, if they prove
definitely superior to the discarded ones. Law consists of
rules; rules have to bind not only the parties but also the
judges. This is not a contrast between common law and
civil law. Does not common law educate us to arrive through
trial and error to more and more certainty? I submit, con-
flicts law needs, more than any other field, solid rules, sus-
ceptible of being managed harmoniously in the various
countries. I am afraid that without them there will be
much trial and nothing but error.4
2. Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U. S. 313 (1943).
3. Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 56 YALE L. J.
1155, 1177 (1947): the fetters of territoriality, the jurisdictional ap-proach and the conflict of laws mechanism based thereon are broken.
4. The problem has been discussed recently in Europe with the
same result: De Nova, in STDIA GHISLERINA (Ser. 1 No. 5, Pavia
1949]
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The following are a few illustrations of the possibility
to reach universal conflicts rules by comparative studies and
international co-operation. They are taken from the law of
contracts and do not exhaust the many kinds of suggestions
provided by the study of foreign laws and the habits of in-
ternational business.
1. Comparing, for instance, the conflicts rules on volun-
tary assignment, we may be amazed to, discern, among ob-
scure approaches, three definite systems--each of which is
right and wrong at the same time. Each one is focused on
one or at most on two sides of what is a triangle. The Ameri-
can rule emphasizes the place of the assignment, excepting
only the question of assignability which is referred to the
law governing the debt. The German and Swiss doctrine
places every question which does not concern a promise to
assign under the latter law. The French courts look only
to the law of the debtor's domicil. In reality three com-
plexes of problems exist, needing three separate rules. We
have to combine and correct all three systems.
2. Suppose an English merchant and the agent of a
New York firm meet in Paris and agree on a sale of goods
to be sent from Ceylon to Antwerp, f.o.b. Bombay. What law
is called for? There is a place of contracting and at least
three places of performance. French, English, American,
Ceylonese, Indian, or Belgian law? In every court another
law? In overseas sales of goods, the uncertainty of solu-
tion is so disagreeable to commerce that the International
Law Association worked out a draft of a convention on con-
flicts law which subsequently was discussed in the Sixth
Hague Conference in 1928, and, there frustrated by doc-
trinal disputes, was revised by a committee of outstanding
experts. The main principle to be taken from there should
be that a sale of goods is governed by the law of the domicil
of the seller. This is a convincing solution. More doubtful:
in what cases should the law of the buyer govern? The com-
mittees stumbled on this point. But here long and thorough
comparative research in the municipal sales laws has shown
the overwhelming importance of the place up to which the
seller bears the burden of custody and risk. In sales per-
1947); D5lle, Gegenwartsfragen des Internationalen Privatrechts,
DEUTSCHE RECHTSZEITSCHRIFT (Befheft #5, Germany 1948); Zweigert,
Die Dritte Schule im Internationalen Privatrecht, in Festschrift fir
Leo Raape 51 (Germany 1948).
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formed by shipping it is most frequently the delivery to the
carrier that is the center of the transaction. After I sug-
gested that this contact should be material, I have been thank-
ful for Professor Stumberg's collection, in his book of 1937,
of American decisions concerning the questions what place
should determine the standards of quality and the construc-
tion of implied warranties.5 Equal branded potatoes were
sold, and the court applied the standard of the place of con-
tracting. Ground sheep manure was sold, and its standard
was determined by the law of the place of performance.
But the f.o.b. place, to which the seller carries the goods,
in the former case was in his state, while in the latter it was in
that of the buyer. And the same distinction was consistently
but reticently observed in other decisions. This is quite a
remarkable hint for achieving an internationally useful rule.
Commercial thinking is correctly felt and satisfied.
3. Maritime carriage of goods: Goods are transported
on an Italian vessel from New York to Rio de Janeiro. What
law governs the contract of affreightment (as distinguished
from the effects of a negotiable bill of lading)? The new
Italian Code of Navigation applies the law of the flag,
Italian. Any American court is sure to apply the American
law of "contracting." The Brazilian Code is equally stern
in applying Brazilian law as that of the domestic port of
destination. This is our present anarchy. Uniformity would
be so easily acquired if the motives were brought into the
open and the rule were clarified that in reality is in the
mind of the American and also the English and French,
Dutch, and other courts. The port in which the goods are
loaded and the bill of lading is issued is the most significant
point of the transaction, by administrative supervision and
by commercial conception.
4. Similarly, services of attorneys, of physicians, of
brokers, and of all independent contractors are determined by
the courts everywhere under the law of their domicil; the
employment contract of a servant should reasonably be gov-
erned by the law of the principal's place of business where
the employee is integrated in the service; authority of an
agent by the law of the place where he uses his authoriza-
tion.
5. Insurance is a particularly intriguing subject. Ameri-
5. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 372-375 (1937).
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can courts choosing the law applicable to any insurance con-
tract usually state a "well settled" rule that validity of a
contract is governed by the law of the place where the con-
tract is made, and that this depends on the last act complet-
ing the contract; delivery of the policy is the last act, and
if the policy is sent directly to the client by mail, it is at
the home office; when the policy is sent to the agent of the
company who delivers it to the insured, the contract is made
at the latter's place-with more ensuing casuistry. Super-
ficially regarded, the practice is based on stable rules. But
these are ritualistic gestures. What really happens looks
different.
On the question what law governs a life insurance con-
tract, Professor Carnahan has revealed in seven-hundred
pages not one but very many answers, describing them in
highly cautious formulations. More simply, it has been esti-
mated that in seventy-five per cent of the cases the law of
the domicil of the insured has been applied, in the remaining
cases the law of the home office of the insurance carrier.
Whether one or the other law was selected, the result in
the overwhelming majority benefited the party suing against
the company.7
This practice, however, should not be considered with-
out observing the state statutes. They are difficult to sum-
marize, beset with obscurities, and using a variety of tech-
niques. Yet although few states say it definitely, the all-
pervading tendency is to extend supervision of the insurance
business to the widest scope. Where a statute is satisfied
with a list of selected impositions and prohibitions, the list
grows fast and large. Where the forms of policy must be
submitted to a superintendent or commissioner, I under-
stand that in practice the result of amiable negotiation is that
practically nothing material happens without state authoriza-
tion.
In a third field of dynamics, the Constitution, the long
line of decisions dealing with insurance has come to the
present stage where in the opinion of the Supreme Court
justices, state power to regulate insurance business is un-
6. CARNAHAN, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACTS
(1942).
7. See CARNAHaN, ibid., and BATIFFOL, LES CONFLICTS DE LoIs EN
MATIERE DE CONTRACTS 294 et seq. (1938).
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limited, except for discriminating and unreasonable pro-
visions, and for mutual benefit associations.
In all three aspects the development points to the same
direction, towards the supremacy of the state supervising the
insurance business to which the contract is deemed to belong.
The private law most naturally applicable to an insurance
contract is that of the state exercising the administrative
control of the insurer, at his headquarters or at his foreign
place of business, respectively. The European doctrine has
definitely reached this clear conclusion, with strong em-
phasis on the technical basis of insurance and the inevitable
division of international insurance business into national
departments. A draft of a uniform statute by a Committee
of the American Bar Association under the chairmanship
of Professor Edwin W. Patterson has proposed a strikingly
similar treatment.8
Collecting all these valuable suggestions, it should not
be difficult after renewed studies of the particulars to agree
on rules that, roughly speaking, would recognize the law of
the insurer's central office when the parties rely on it, not
because the policy is mailed there. Further, the rules should
recognize much more frequently in life and health insurance
the law of the residence of the insured, because the state of
this place regulates the business of which the contract is a
part-we may say because the agent of the insurer is acting
there rather than because the policy is handed to the insured.
And finally, we should adopt the law of the situation of ob-
jects insured against fire or crop damage, because the risk
is situated there.
This example is characteristic of numerous situations
where the American doctrines come near to the solution we
may desire after examination of a problem and its treat-
ment throughout the world, but need adjustment. Only a
little step is needed also for the rules on formalities of legal
acts, the place of tort, the extent of an agent's power-and
the rule, if consistently applied to the given phenomenon
of life, would be sound.
In this entire work of creating a body of rules adequate
for interstate as well as international reciprocal use, every
8. "An Act Concerning the Conflict of Laws in Relation to In-
surance Contracts" in American Bar Association, Section of Insurance
Law, Program (for the) Annual Meeting in San Francisco 50 (1939).
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student of conflicts law is able to participate and is highly wel-
come to take his share, even though he may not be familiar
with foreign laws. My suggestion would be that the im-
pressive interest in conflicts law manifested in the law re-
views should not prevailingly be devoted to the questionable
arguments so often advanced in judicial decisions, but to the
discovery of the desirable solution, to the guidance that the
courts deserve in their difficult task. More than usual, special
problems of restricted size should be totally investigated,
with all their social and legal aspects including international
justice. And the query should be: What is positively the
rule to be written in a new Restatement? If academic and
other scholars do this work, they not only promote Ameri-
can law but achieve an exceedingly useful and eminently de-
sirable contribution to international research and agreement.
Whoever is in a position to explore foreign sources is
at an advantage. But I should like to emphasize how very
valuable English translations would be at the present time,
and to reiterate the necessity of an international review of
comparative law.
It is a great cause which we have to serve: the higher
unity in which to join legal history and legal system, legal
theory and practice, and common law and civil law. Conflict
of laws is a vital bridge between all of them-a bridge need-
ing repair today.
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